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11 Introduction
What determines the growth rate of a ﬁrm? The average growth rate of capital stock
of ﬁrms that continuously appear in the COMPUSTAT data set between 1970 and
1999 was about 16% during the 1970s, 14% during the 1980s and 15% during the
1990s1. Major companies in the U.S. continued to grow for the 30 years covered by
our data set.
In order to explain the continuous expansion of a ﬁrm, traditional investment
theories typically assume the existence of a convex adjustment cost function [e.g.,
Lucas and Prescott (1971)]. This explicitly links the growth rate of capital to Tobin’s
Q. The derived growth rate is independent of the ﬁrm’s size, which arguably serves
as a ﬁrst approximation for the growth of a large ﬁrm [e.g., Sutton (1997)]. The
dynamics of a ﬁrm are described as a process of adjustment toward the desired capital
stock.
However, this adjustment cost function is questioned by evidence that investment
is lumpy at the plant level [e.g., Doms and Dunne (1998)]. Lumpy investment is
more consistent with alternative theories that emphasize the importance of a non-
convex adjustment cost function [ e.g., Caballero (1999)]. Diﬀerent from the Q
theory of investment, adjustment is immediate once a ﬁrm decides to invest. Hence,
continuous growth must be explained by expanding exogenous external investment
opportunities2.
In contrast to previous literature, this paper completely dismisses conventional
adjustment cost functions from our model and examines an alternative friction: a
1The average growth rate of capital is the net value of property, plant and equipment (Compustat
# 8) over the deﬂator for nonresidential investment. The deﬂator is taken from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis.
2Abel and Eberly (1994) incorporate two frictions into one model and discuss its relation to
Q. Cooper and Haltiwanger (2000) argue that a model that mixes both convex and nonconvex
adjustment costs with irreversibility ﬁts plant-level data well.
2ﬁrm cannot optimize more than one input3. Hence, the immediate adjustment of
more than one input is prohibited. It is shown that each investment is lumpy as in
sunk cost models, but adjustment is gradual as in convex adjustment cost models.
The particular friction that this paper aims to capture is the limited capacity
of human attention, the importance of which was originally emphasized by Simon
(1947). It is a common observation that organizations demand millions of immedi-
ate decisions, but individual CEOs are not able to handle all of them at the same
t i m e . A si ti sd i ﬃcult to delegate strategic decisions, such as ﬁnding investment
projects, to other managers, CEOs must spend much of their time making and im-
plementing an investment plan. Because their attention capacity is limited, CEOs
must postpone other strategic decisions such as developing a trained management
group. We investigate how the allocation of attention inﬂuences the growth rate of
a ﬁrm.
In order to determine the growth rate, we need one more assumption: there is
interaction among inputs, where the interaction means that inputs are strict comple-
ments or strict substitutes. When there is no interaction among inputs, adjustment
is immediate: the ﬁrm immediately chooses the optimal level of inputs and maintains
it. However, when interaction exists, the current optimal decision depends on the
amount of other inputs. It is shown that adjustment then becomes gradual.
In this paper, we examine two-input cases, in which the inputs are called capital
and labor. Two decisions are called investment and employment. To give an
intuitive reason for gradual adjustment, consider the case where a ﬁrm’s attention is
alternately allocated to investment and employment. Suppose that capital and labor
are complements and that the amounts of capital and labor are less than optimal. In
this case, proﬁts would be larger if the ﬁrm could increase both capital and labor at
the same time. Hence, when the ﬁrm makes its investment decision, it invests more
3This assumption is the same as the one that a ﬁrm must incur inﬁnite ﬁxed costs when more
than one decision is made. Hence, the model can be interpreted as a variant of a sunk cost model,
though the ﬁrm never incurs sunk costs.
3than needed for current production in order to increase the marginal product of labor
and to enhance employment in the next period. Similarly, when the ﬁrm makes its
employment decision, it employs more than needed for current production in order
to increase the marginal product of capital and to enhance its investment in the next
period. This capital and labor hoarding increases cost for current production. This
static loss plays the role of adjustment cost.
Similar to the Q theory of investment, the adjustment cost derived has the prop-
erty that the accumulated capital stock lowers the marginal cost of capital hoarding.
Hence, it causes a positive feedback mechanism that enhances the continuous ad-
justment of a ﬁrm: an increase in capital stock lowers the marginal cost of capital
hoarding, which gives more incentive to accumulate capital.
The following example is illustrative. Consider a ﬁrm that needs both an oﬃce
and skilled managers as productive inputs. When the ﬁrm constructs a building,
it will keep spare space. The spare space is not needed for current production, but
it allows the ﬁrm to employ and train more managers in future. Similarly, excess
trained managers are needed to set up a new oﬃce in a diﬀerent region in the future.
Although the spare spaces prepare for future expansion, it is costly to build a sky-
scraper when a ﬁrm currently employs only three managers. In this way, adjustment
cost is endogenized. Note that once the ﬁrm employs 30 managers, it may be worth
constructing a building for them. That is, the existence of many skilled managers
as a result of the previous capital accumulation lowers the static loss due to capital
hoarding and enhances further capital accumulation.
The above adjustment process may not occur when a ﬁrm can optimally allocate
its attention. It may be optimal to stick to an employment decision. In this case,
because a ﬁrm does not need to hoard labor, there is no growth. This might happen
when the owner of a restaurant cares only about employing or training skilled chefs
but not about investing in a new restaurant.
A natural question is: What might be the conditions under which the ﬁrm starts
4its adjustment? This paper derives necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the ﬁrm
to adjust to the desired level under a constant-returns-to-scale production function.
Intuitively, the ﬁrm must compare two types of rents: rent from changing its attention
and that from sticking to one decision. The ﬁrm starts its adjustment if and only if
the former rent is larger than the latter. We argue that when many workers quit a
job and a ﬁrm cannot accumulate skills, the ﬁrm sticks to employment and stops its
adjustment to the desired capital stock4.
Assuming that the condition for the adjustment is satisﬁed, this paper derives the
growth rate of a ﬁrm when the production function has constant returns to scale, there
is no adjustment cost function and markets are competitive. The derived growth
rate is shown to be a positive function of the modiﬁed user cost and the modiﬁed
w a g er a t e ,b o t ho fw h i c ha r ec o r r e l a t e dw i t hT o b i n ’ sQ. It is shown that even if there
is no adjustment cost function and the production function has constant returns to
scale, Tobin’s Q can deviate from one and contains information about investment
opportunities.
The dynamics of investment have some empirical support. On the one hand,
because there is no convex adjustment cost function in our model, each investment
is lumpy, which is similar to a model with sunk cost. On the other hand, once
decisions are aggregated over time, the investment—capital ratio is independent of
the ﬁr m ’ ss i z ea n dc o r r e l a t e dw i t hT o b i n ’ sQ, which is similar to the Q theory of
investment. In contrast to the Q theory of investment, the correlation between the
derived investment—capital ratio and Tobin’s Q is imperfect. Our calibration results
show that the investment—capital ratio has a weak positive correlation with Q,b u t
once we control for the cash ﬂow—capital ratio, the correlation becomes negative.
That is, the investment—capital ratio has a stronger positive relationship with the
4The results may interest readers for an alternative reason, because if a ﬁrm sticks to one decision,
it cannot reach the standard optimal solutions. It implies that the standard proﬁt maximization
problem may not be a good approximation of reality if limited attention is important. The derived
condition clariﬁes when the standard model is valid.
5cash ﬂow—capital ratio. The weak correlation between Q and investment is found in
the literature [e.g., Chirinko (1993)], and the robust impact of cash ﬂow on investment
is also well known [e.g., Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988)].
Although we examine a model of limited attention, agents are perfectly rational,
which is diﬀerent from Simon (1947). In our model, attention is required to im-
plement a plan. A similar strategy was previously used by Giﬀord (1992). She
investigated the role of limited attention on the growth of a ﬁrm in a dynamic pro-
gramming framework such as ours. However, Giﬀord (1992) does not investigate the
interaction among inputs and, therefore, adjustment is immediate5.
Investment decisions with complementary capital are investigated by Dixit (1997),
Eberly and Mieghem (1997) and Jovanovic and Stolyarov (2000). In particular,
Jovanovic and Stolyarov (2000) also produce spare spaces. However, their model
does not deal with the limited capacity of attention and, therefore, the source of
growth is exogenous movement of frontier technology.
This paper can be also interpreted as constructing a micro foundation for the
adjustment cost of investment. To our knowledge, the literature that derives the
adjustment cost of investment relies on gradual learning [e.g., Prescott and Viss-
cher (1980)]. This paper does not include an information problem but still derives
adjustment cost because hoarding behavior causes static losses.
Recently, Abel and Eberly (2003) proposed an investment model without an ad-
justment cost function. Similarly to ours, their model also predicts that Tobin’s Q
can be greater than one without adjustment cost, and the investment—capital ratio
is correlated with Tobin’s Q but not with marginal Q. In their model, investment
5More recently, some researchers investigated limited attention in a rational agent model to ex-
plain the stickiness of prices [Reis (2004)]. They describe limited attention by assuming information
processing friction . In contrast, this paper limits the number of decisions an agent can take im-
mediately. This strategy allows us to investigate interaction among inputs, which is the key to
deriving a positive feedback mechanism for capital accumulation. We hope that our strategy nicely
complements theirs.
6opportunities are provided by exogenous rent due to monopoly power or decreasing-
returns-to-scale technology. By contrast, our model does not need any exogenous
shocks and is based on constant-returns-to-scale technology and a perfectly compet-
itive market. Because the ﬁrm cannot optimize two inputs at the same time, there
is a ﬁxed input at each moment that creates quasi-rent, which provides an incentive
for the ﬁrm to grow.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section examines the ﬁrm that
allocates its attention alternately to investment and employment decisions. This
exercise clariﬁes an intuitive mechanism to induce the dynamics of a ﬁrm. Section 3
analyzes the optimization of the allocation of attention. Section 4 investigates the
conditions under which the ﬁrm adjusts to the desired level. Assuming that the
ﬁrm satisﬁes the conditions for adjustment, Section 5 derives the growth rate of a
ﬁrm. Section 6 calibrates the model and discusses quantitative relationships between
investment, Q and cash ﬂow in this model. Section 7 concludes and discusses possible
extensions.
2 The Alternate Allocation of Attention
In this section, we examine a standard ﬁrm’s proﬁt maximization problem, except
that a ﬁrm can optimize only one input at a time. In order to illustrate our idea,
we assume that the ﬁrm alternates its attention. This assumption is relaxed in the
next section.
As a benchmark, we ﬁrst consider a stylized static problem. A ﬁrm maximizes its
proﬁts by choosing capital and labor given the wage rate, w, the user cost of capital,
u, and the production function F (K,L),w h e r eK is capital stock and L is labor
measured in eﬃciency units. Although we call K and L capital and labor for the
purpose of explanation, our mechanism works for any inputs.
Assuming that the production function is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, bounded,
7and strictly concave, and that the solutions are interior, it is known that the ﬁrm’s
decisions are characterized by two ﬁrst-order conditions:





where K∗ and L∗ are the solutions to this static optimization problem. Since the
marginal products of capital and labor are equal to user cost and wage rates, the ﬁrm
has no incentive to change its decision.
One of the important assumptions behind this result is that the ﬁrm can maximize
labor and capital at the same time. However, this may not be true in reality. When
a ﬁrm invests, it must consider thousands of matters: which machine to buy, where
to set it, who should be assigned as an operator and so on. Our economic model
is abstracted from these details. However, it is natural to think that planning and
implementation are time consuming. More speciﬁc a l l y ,w ea s s u m et h a tt h eﬁrm can
optimize only one input at a time.
When the ﬁrm optimizes an input, another input is assumed to be constant. This
assumption aims to capture a role of routine operation. When the ﬁrm makes optimal
decisions in investment, they presume that they maintain the same amount of labor
as before6. After investment is made, the previous level of labor may not be optimal.
However, as the previous level of labor is the result of past optimization, it would
be one of the best alternatives given the restriction of limited attention. In this
way, maintaining the same level can be interpreted as a very primitive description
of “remembering by doing” which Nelson and Winter (1982, p.99) emphasize as an
important function of a routine.
Given these assumptions, the standard problem must be rewritten as the following
dynamic programming problem:
6Note that we measure labor in eﬃciency units. Hence, labor is considered to be the set of skills
a c c u m u l a t e di naﬁrm. The development of more skilled workers would demand time and attention.
However, it would be an innocuous assumption that the ﬁrm can maintain the same level of human
capital without attention.




0 − uK + βVk (L
0)},
Vk (L)= m a x
K0∈R+
{F (K
0,L) − wL− uK
0 + βVl (K
0)},
where β ∈ (0,1) is a discount factor, and Vl (K) and Vk (L) a r et h ev a l u eo ft h eﬁrm
when it currently makes an employment decision and when it currently makes an
investment decision, respectively. Because routinely chosen inputs are assumed to
be constant, when the ﬁrm makes an investment decision, labor is considered a stock
variable; when the ﬁrm makes an employment decision, capital is a stock variable.
Two ﬁrst-order conditions are
FL (K,λ(K)) = w − βV
0
k (λ(K)), (1)
FK (κ(L),L)=u − βV
0
l (κ(L)), (2)
where λ(K) and κ(L) are optimal policy functions. Compared with the ﬁrst-order
conditions for simple static optimization, marginal cost deviates from input prices
because of the additional terms, βV 0
k (λ(K)) and βV 0
l (κ(L)). Because the current
investment decision (employment decision) can inﬂuence future proﬁts, this possibility
must be taken into account. Hence, the marginal products of capital and labor must
be equal to input prices minus the eﬀe c t so nf u t u r ep r o ﬁts. We call w −βV 0
k (λ(K))
the modiﬁed wage rate and u − βV 0
l (κ(L)) the modiﬁed user cost.
To illustrate the main idea, we assume that the value function is twice continuously













Because we assume a strict concave production function, the value functions are also
strictly concave. Therefore, the denominators of the two equations are negative. This
9means that both policy functions are strictly increasing functions when two inputs
are strict complements ( FKL(K,L) > 0 for all K and L ) and that they are strictly
decreasing functions when two inputs are strict substitutes (FKL(K,L) < 0 for all K
and L ). We assume that the production function is either strictly complementary
or strictly substitutionary. These assumptions are suﬃcient but not necessary for
our results, but it makes our explanation clearer.
Figure 1: The growth and decline of a ﬁrm
We are interested in the following dynamics:
Kt = κ(λ(Kt−1)).
10Equations (3) and (4) imply that current capital stock is strictly increasing in the
previous capital stock if two inputs are either strict complements or strict substitutes.
Figure 1 depicts the dynamics of the ﬁrm, which are shown to be representative,
below. If the initial capital stock is lower than K∗, it grows and converges to K∗.
On the other hand, if the initial capital stock exceeds K∗,t h eﬁrm declines and
converges to K∗.I t i s s h o w n b e l o w t h a t K∗ coincides with an optimal solution to
the static problem. Hence, the process of growth can be seen as the adjustment
process to the desired capital stock.
Note that if FKL(K,L)=0for all K and L, the derivative of the function κ(λ(·))
is 0.H e n c e , κ(λ(Kt−1)) in ﬁgure 1 is horizontal. This means that adjustment is
immediate. It shows that interaction between two inputs for some K and L is
necessary for gradual adjustment.
In order to understand the mechanism of the dynamics, two Euler equations are
derived:
MCLH(Lt,L t−1)=MRLH(Lt),
MCKH(Kt,K t−1)=MRKH(Kt),w h e r e
MCLH(Lt,L t−1) ≡ w − FL (κ(Lt−1),L t),M R L H (Lt) ≡ β [FL (κ(Lt),L t) − w],
MCKH(Kt,K t−1) ≡ u − FK (Kt,λ(Kt−1)),M R K H(Kt) ≡ β [FK (Kt,λ(Kt)) − u].
MCLH(Lt,L t−1) ( MCKH(Kt,K t−1) ) represents the marginal costs of labor hoard-
ing (capital hoarding); MRLH(Lt) ( MRKH(Kt) ) represents the marginal rent
from labor hoarding (capital hoarding). Euler equations show that it is optimal to
equate the marginal cost and marginal rent from hoarding. Since the intuitive logic
is the same, we conﬁne our discussion mainly to capital. However, the reader can
apply the same logic to labor.
MCKH(Kt,K t−1) is deﬁned as the deviation of user cost from the marginal prod-
uct of capital. When user costs are larger than the marginal productivity of capital,
11the ﬁrm employs more capital than is needed for current production. Employing
one more unit of capital increases expenses by user cost and output by the marginal
product of capital. Hence, the deviation of user cost from the marginal productivity
can be considered the marginal cost of capital hoarding. Although we do not have
any adjustment cost function, the cost of capital hoarding serves as adjustment cost
in this paper.
On the other hand, hoarding capital generates a proﬁt opportunity for the ﬁrm
in the next period, because when the ﬁrm invests in capital, it knows that capital is
ﬁxed in the next period: it creates rent from capital. In order to increase this rent,
the ﬁrm has an incentive to invest more than needed. Employing one more unit of
capital increases output by the marginal product of capital and ﬁxed cost by user
cost. Hence, the marginal rent from capital hoarding is the present value of this
diﬀerence, which is how MRKH(Kt) is deﬁned.
When the ﬁrm reaches the steady state, K∗ and L∗,t h eﬁrm keeps the same level
of capital stock and labor. Hence, there is no reason to maintain capital hoarding.
Substituting K∗ = Kt = Kt−1 and L∗ = Lt = Lt−1 into two Euler equations, it
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∗)=w.
By taking the derivative with respect to K around the steady state, the slope of








Since κ(λ(K)) is a strictly increasing function, ﬁgure 1 shows that the dynamics must
be globally stable. Hence, the dynamics depicted by ﬁgure 1 are representative.
In order to understand the mechanism of growth in detail, let us examine MRKH(Kt)
and MCKH(Kt,K t−1). Because of the strict concavity of the production function,
12MCKH(Kt,K t−1) is strictly increasing in Kt. Similarly, because MRKH(Kt)=
βV 0
l (Kt) for all Kt and the value function is strictly concave, MRKH(Kt) is strictly
decreasing in Kt. Hence, the intersection is unique, which is depicted in Figure 2.
The dynamics occur because MCKH(Kt,K t−1) depends on Kt−1.W e c a n d e r i v e




0 (Kt−1) < 0.
Note that when FKL(K,L) > 0, λ
0 (K) > 0, while when FKL(K,L) < 0, λ
0 (K) < 0.
Hence, marginal cost declines as capital accumulates. This provides a nice positive
feedback mechanism: an increase in capital stock reduces the marginal cost of capital
hoarding, which generates incentive for the ﬁrm to make further investment. Figure 2
describes the feedback mechanism. If MCKH(Kt,K t−1) and MRKH(Kt) intersect
at a positive value, capital accumulates. Larger capital lowers the marginal cost of
capital hoarding and provides further incentive to accumulate capital. On the other
hand, if MCKH(Kt,K t−1) and MRKH(Kt) intersect at a negative value, the ﬁrm
disinvests. This increases the marginal cost of capital hoarding and forces the ﬁrm
to give up more capital. Since MCKH(Kt,K t−1) and MRKH(Kt) are equal to 0
when Kt = K∗, the dynamics stop.
In the next section, we assume that the production function has constant returns
to scale in K and L and analyze the optimal allocation of attention. In the case of
constant returns to scale, the production function is not strictly concave, and therefore
there is no steady state in general. Without any proof, the dynamics and mechanism
of the growth of the ﬁrm with a constant-returns-to-scale production function are
depicted in Figure 3 and 4. Figure 4 shows that MRKH(Kt) is constant when the
production function has constant returns to scale. Hence, as Figure 3 shows, the
ﬁrm can grow as far as market conditions allow or can decline until it vanishes.
13Figure 2: The mechanism of growth and decline of a ﬁrm
14Figure 3: The growth and decline of a ﬁrm when the production function
has constant returns to scale
15Figure 4: The mechanism of the growth and decline of a ﬁrm when the
production function has constant returns to scale
163 The Optimal Allocation of Attention
In the previous section, the order of decisions is given. However, the alternate allo-
cation of attention may not be optimal. Some ﬁrms may concentrate on training and
employing workers and not care much about new physical investment. In this sec-
tion, we relax this restriction and assume that the ﬁrm optimally chooses investment
or employment. This makes our analysis more complicated. In order to provide
a tractable model, we assume that F (K,L) exhibits constant returns to scale in K
and L. This assumption has other advantages, too. First, it allows us to link our
theory to Tobin’s Q. Second, since constant returns to scale and a competitive econ-
o m ye l i m i n a t ea n ye c o n o m i cr e n t ,t h eo n l ys o u r c eo fr e n ti nt h i sm o d e lb e c o m e st h e
existence of quasi-ﬁxed input due to routine operation. In this section we show that
the rent from the quasi- ﬁxed factor causes Tobin’s Q to deviate from 1 7.
Let us ﬁrst set up our model:








0 + V ((1 − δk)K,(1 − δl)L
0)}, (6)






0,L) − wL+ V ((1 − δk)K
0,(1 − δl)L)] − pkI}, (7)
s.t. I = K
0 − K,
where α < β = 1
1+i and i is an interest rate. The parameters δk and δl are the
depreciation rate of capital and eﬀective labor, respectively. The parameter pk is
the price of investment goods, and the price of output is normalized to 1.E q u a t i o n
(5) describes the optimal choice of projects, where the projects are investment or
employment, and the value function V (K,L) represents the value of the ﬁrm when
7There is also a cost to assuming constant-returns-to-scale technology. As the production func-
tion is constant returns to scale in K and L, we must restrict our attention to the case of comple-
mentarity, below.
17the ﬁrm currently selects projects. The function Vl (K) represents the value of the
ﬁrm when the ﬁrm currently makes an employment decision, which is deﬁned by
Equation (6) and the function Vk (L;K) represents the value of the ﬁrm when the
ﬁrm currently makes an investment decision, which is deﬁned by Equation (7).
There are three technical diﬀerences from the previous section. First, we explicitly
model investment decisions in Equation (7) and exclude rental expenses of capital
from the model. The explicit expression of an investment decision clariﬁes the link
between investment and Tobin’s Q. The timing of discounting and depreciation
rate is arranged so we can later derive Jorgenson’s user cost. Second, we allow the
depreciations of capital and labor. The depreciation of labor is unusual. Since
we consider L as human capital rather than the number of workers, it has to be
interpreted as the depreciation rate of human capital in a ﬁrm. Finally, there are
explicit upper bounds on choice variables, which are inﬂuenced by α < β.T h i s
guarantees that the solution does not explode and that there exists a unique value
function V (K,L). The proof is an application of Stokey and Lucas (1989, p87) and
we omit it8.
Since the production function has constant returns to scale, the value function is
expected to be linear in K, V (K,L)=Q(l)K where l = L
K.D e ﬁne the deviation





pk. The standard guess and verify method


































where k0 = K0
L , l0 = L0
K, αk = α
1−δk, αl = α
1−δl and f (·)=F (·,1).T h e v a r i a b l e u
is Jorgenson’s (1963) user cost, u ≡ (i + δk)pk.V a r i a b l e , πk ( πl ) is the present
8Technically, it is also assumed that there is BF ∈ (0,∞),w h i c hs a t i s ﬁes |F (K,L)| ≤
BF (|K| + |L|) for any K ∈ R+ and L ∈ R+.
18value of the stream of the discounted rent per unit labor (per unit capital) when
the ﬁrm currently makes an investment decision (employment decision). The rent
exists because there are quasi-ﬁxed factors in the model. We call πk and πl the
average rent when the ﬁrm makes an investment decision and an employment decision,
respectively.
Substituting the deﬁnition of D(l) into the deﬁnition of πk and πl, we can express
πk and πl as the solutions to the following two equations. The proof of the following
proposition is given in the Appendix.





pk, is a function
of two measures of average rent, πk and πl :
D(l)=β max{πkl,πl},
where πk and πl are the solutions to the following two equations:
πk =m a x {Πk (u − βkπl),Πk (u)+βlπk} (10)
πl =m a x {Πl (w − βlπk),Πl (w)+βkπl}. (11)




0] − w (12)










0 − u (13)
where βk =( 1− δk)β and βl =( 1− δl)β.
The function Πk (x) ( Πl (x) ) is the average instantaneous proﬁtf u n c t i o nw h e n
the ﬁrm invests ( employs ) and maps from the prices for the variable inputs to
instantaneous proﬁts per unit labor (per unit capital).
The proposition shows that Tobin’s Q can deviate from 1 when max{πkl,πl} is not
equal to 0 and that πk and πl are the maximums of diﬀerent types of the average rent.
Let us explain the meaning of equation (10). We can apply the same arguments to
Equation (11). When the ﬁrm makes an investment decision and the next decision is
employment, the ﬁrm invests more than is needed for current production to increase
19the marginal product of labor at the next period. Because of this additional beneﬁt,
the relevant user cost for this investment is the modiﬁed user cost, u − βkπl,w h i c h
is explained in Section 2. Hence, the average rent from changing its attention to
employment is Πk (u − βkπl). However, if the ﬁrm continues to invest during the
next period, there is no beneﬁt from capital hoarding. Hence, the relevant user cost
is equal to Jorgenson’s. After maximizing proﬁts, given an input price of u,t h e
ﬁrm expects to receive πk again at the next period. Hence, the average rent from
holding to an investment decision is Πk (u)+βlπk. Equation (10) shows that πk is
t h em a x i m u mo ft h et w ot y p e so ft h ea v e r a g er e n t .
The next section solves Equations (10) and (11), and derives the conditions under
which the ﬁrm alternates its attention and adjusts to the desired level.
4 When Does a Firm Adjust to the Desired Level?
This section investigates the condition under which it is optimal to alternate its
attention. Firstly, exploiting the beneﬁts of stationarity, the sequential problem
expressed in Equations (10) and (11) is modiﬁed into a one shot problem. Let us
deﬁne Gl (πk), Gk (πl), Rl,a n dRk as








New functions Gl (πk) and Gk (πl) are mapping from πk to πl and πl to πk, respec-
tively. New variables Rl ( Rk ) are the present discounted value of the stream of rent
per unit capital (per unit labor) when the ﬁrm sticks to employment ( investment
). We call Rl and Rk the reservation value of average rents when the ﬁrm sticks to
employment and investment, respectively.
We deﬁne the following new problem:
πk =m a x {Gk (πl),R k}, (14)
20πl =m a x {Gl (πk),R l}. (15)
The new problem says that the ﬁrm adjusts to the desired level when the two average
rents from changing attention are larger than their reservation values. Since the
environment is stationary, this one shot problem is expected to be equivalent to the




l denote the solutions to Equations (10) and (11),
and let π∗
k and π∗
l denote the solutions to Equations (14) and (15). The following
lemma shows that the new problem is equivalent to the original one. The proof is
established in the Appendix.
Lemma 2 The solutions to Equations (10) and (11) are equivalent to the solutions










The lemma permits us to work with Equations (14) and (15). In order to char-
acterize the conditions under which adjustment takes place, it is convenient to deﬁne
mappings Hl (πl) and Hk (πk):
Hk (πk)=πk − Gk (Gl (πk)), (16)
Hl (πl)=πl − Gl (Gk (πl)). (17)
Let π∗∗
k and π∗∗
l denote the solutions to π∗∗
k = Gk (π∗∗
l ) and π∗∗
l = Gl (π∗∗
k ).T h e n
Hl (π
∗∗
l )=0 ,H k (π
∗∗
k )=0 . (18)
That is, the solutions to Equations (18) characterize the average rents when the ﬁrm
adjusts to the desired level. We ﬁrst state the property of H - functions. The proof
i sg i v e ni nt h eA p p e n d i x .
Lemma 3 The functions Hl (·) and Hk (·) are strictly increasing and concave:
H
0
l (πl) > 0,H
0
k (πk) > 0 (19)
H
00
l (πl) ≤ 0,H
00
k (πk) ≤ 0. (20)
21Since Lemma 3 shows that Hl (·) and Hk (·) are continuous and strictly increasing
functions, the existence and uniqueness of π∗∗
l ( π∗∗
k ) can be proved by showing that
for some small πl ( πk ), Hl (πl) < 0 ( Hk (πk) < 0 )a n df o ro t h e rl a r g eπl ( πk ),
Hl (πl) > 0 ( Hk (πk) > 0 ). The formal proof of the following theorem is given in
the Appendix.
Theorem 4 There exists a unique π∗∗
l and π∗∗
k .
Now, we are ready to provide conditions under which the ﬁrm alternates its at-
tention. The following theorem achieves this. The proof is established in the
Appendix.
Theorem 5 The ﬁrm alternates its attention and adjusts to the desired level, if and
only if Hl (Rl) < 0 and Hk (Rk) < 0:








k >R k. (21)
Note that Hl (Rl) and Hk (Rk) are not inﬂuenced by endogenous variables. This
means that Theorem 5 characterizes technological and market conditions when the
ﬁrm adjusts to the desired level. The intuition behind this condition is explained as
follows. Note that
Hl (Rl) < 0,i f fR l <G l (Gk (Rl)), (22)
Hk (Rk) < 0,i f fR k <G k (Gl (Rk)). (23)
The left-hand side of Equation (22), Rl, is the average rent when the ﬁrm holds to em-
ployment decision from now on. The right-hand side of Equation (22), Gl (Gk (Rl)),
is the average rent when the ﬁrm holds to employment after the ﬁrm changes its
attention once. Since the environment is stationary, if the ﬁrm changes its attention
once, it will continue to do so. A similar interpretation is applied to Equation (23).
Hence, Theorem 5 says that when the beneﬁt from a one-time change in its attention
22Figure 5: Hl (Rl)< 0,Hk (Rk)< 0: In this case, the ﬁrm alternates its attention
between investment and employment and adjusts to the desired level. The solid line
represents max{Gk (πl),R k} and max{Gl (πk),R l} and the intersection of the two
solid lines is the solution.
23is greater than sticking to the same decision for both investment and employment, it
is optimal for the ﬁrm to allocate its attention and make its adjustment.
A graphical explanation of this result is depicted in Figure 5. Note that Theorem
(5) is restated as
G
−1
l (Rl) <G k (Rl),G
−1
k (Rk) <G l (Rk),i f fπ
∗





l (Rl) <G k (Rl) and G
−1
k (Rk) <G l (Rk), are satisﬁed in Figure
5. The two solid lines represent max{Gk (πl),R k} and max{Gl (πk),R l}. Hence,
the intersection of the two solid lines is the solution to the original problem. As you
can see, π∗
k >R k and π∗
l >R l.
How do economic parameters inﬂuence the conditions for adjustment? Unfortu-
nately, changes in most of the parameters do not bring clear results. We compare the
average rent from sticking to one decision and that from changing attention. Most of
the parameters, such as w and u,i n ﬂu e n c eb o t hr e n t si nt h es a m ed i r e c t i o n . H e n c e ,
the eﬀect of w and u on the conditions for adjustment depends on which rents are
more inﬂuenced by w and u. However, a relatively simple condition is obtained for
the eﬀect of the depreciation of labor.








The condition implies that the larger the depreciation, the more likely the con-
dition for adjustment is violated. As argued below, when the depreciation rate of
labor is large, the ﬁrm is likely to hold to the employment decision. A company
that cannot maintain human capital does not expect high proﬁts from investment.
Hence, it must spend much time recruiting and training workers.
Note that there is an asymmetry between the depreciation of labor and capital
because the depreciation of capital also inﬂuences user cost, u. This additional eﬀect
24obscures the result. If we can keep u constant, the eﬀect of δk is similar to that of
δl.
When the ﬁrm holds to one decision, there are three possible cases: the ﬁrm
holds to investment, the ﬁrm holds to employment, or the ﬁrm’s attention depends
on the initial capital—labor ratio. The following theorem establishes the necessary
and suﬃcient conditions under which each case occurs. The proof is established in
the Appendix.
Theorem 7 Suppose Hl (Rl) ≥ 0 or Hk (Rk) ≥ 0.
Gl (Rk) >R l,G k (Rl) ≤ Rk,i f fπ
∗
l = Gl (Rk) >R l, π
∗
k = Rk, (24)
Gl (Rk) ≤ Rl,G k (Rl) >R k,i f fπ
∗
l = Rl, π
∗
k = Gk (Rl) >R k, (25)
Gl (Rk) ≤ Rl,G k (Rl) ≤ Rk,i f fπ
∗
l = Rl, π
∗
k = Rk. (26)
Equation (24) shows the condition under which the ﬁrm holds to investment,
Equation (25) shows the condition under which the ﬁrm holds to employment and
Equation (26) shows the condition under which the allocation of attention depends
on the initial capital—labor ratio.
Figure 6, 7 and 8 provide the examples for each case. In ﬁgure 6, Hk (Rk) ≥ 0
( G
−1
k (Rk) ≥ Gl (Rk) ), Gl (Rk) >R l,a n dGk (Rl) ≤ Rk are satisﬁed. It shows
that π∗
l = Gl (Rk) >R l and π∗
k = Rk.S i n c e Gl (Rk) >R l,w h e naﬁrm makes an
employment decision, the next decision is investment. However, because Gk (Rl) ≤
Rk,o n c et h eﬁrm makes an investment decision, it does not change its attention.
Hence, the ﬁrm holds to investment decisions.
In Figure 7, Hl (Rl) ≥ 0 ( G
−1
k (Rk) ≥ Gl (Rk) ), Hk (Rk) ≥ 0 ( G
−1
l (Rl) ≥ Gk (Rl)
), Gl (Rk) ≤ Rl and Gk (Rl) >R k are satisﬁed. It shows that π∗
l = Rl and π∗
k =
Gk (Rl) >R k. The condition Gk (Rl) >R k means that when the ﬁrm makes an
investment decision, the next decision is employment; Gl (Rk) ≤ Rl m e a n st h a to n c e
the ﬁrm makes an employment decision, it does not change its attention. Hence, the
ﬁrm holds to employment.
25Figure 6: Hk (Rk)≥ 0,Gl (Rk)> Rl,Gk (Rl)≤ Rk: In this case, the ﬁrm holds to
investment. The solid line represents max{Gk (πl),R k} and max{Gl (πk),R l} and
the intersection of the solid lines is the solution.
26Figure 7: Hl (Rl)≥ 0,Hk (Rk)≥ 0,Gl (Rk)≤ Rl,Gk (Rl)> Rk: In this case, the
ﬁrm sticks to employment. The solid line represents max{Gk (πl),R k} and
max{Gl (πk),R l} and the intersection of the solid lines is the solution.
27Figure 8: Hl (Rl)≥ 0,Hk (Rk)≥ 0,Gl (Rk)≤ Rl,Gk (Rl)≤ Rk: In this case, an ini-
tial capital—labor ratio determines the allocation of the ﬁrm’s attention. The solid
line represents max{Gk (πl),R k} and max{Gl (πk),R l} and the intersection of the
solid lines is the solution.
28Note that when the employment decision is solved by an interior solution, an
increase in the depreciation rate of labor lowers Gl (Rk) and Rk, while it keeps Gk (Rl)
and Rl the same. Hence, it is likely that the large depreciation rate forces the ﬁrm
to hold to employment. This conﬁrms our previous argument about the eﬀect of a
change in the depreciation rate of labor.
In ﬁgure 8, Hl (Rl) ≥ 0 ( G
−1
k (Rk) ≥ Gl (Rk) ), Hk (Rk) ≥ 0 ( G
−1
l (Rl) ≥
Gk (Rl) ), Gl (Rk) ≤ Rl and Gk (Rl) ≤ Rk are satisﬁed. Because Gl (Rk) ≤ Rl and
Gk (Rl) ≤ Rk are satisﬁed, once the ﬁrm allocates its attention either to investment or
to employment, it never changes its attention. The allocation of the ﬁrm’s attention
depends on its initial capital—labor ratio. If its initial capital—labor ratio is large
enough, the marginal productivity of labor is larger than the marginal productivity
of capital and the ﬁrm holds to employment. If an initial capital—labor ratio is small
enough, the opposite is true: the ﬁrm holds to investment.
5 Investment and the Growth of a Firm
Suppose that Hl (Rl) < 0 and Hk (Rk) < 0.T h e ﬁrm alternates its attention. This










= κ(u − βkπ
∗
l)(1− δl)λ(w − βlπ
∗
k) − 1,
where κ(·) and λ(·) are the optimal policy functions corresponding to Equations
(12) and (13), respectively. Using Hotelling’s lemma, the optimal policy functions












l (w − βlπ
∗
k).
T h ef o l l o w i n gt h e o r e ms u m m a r i z e st h ea b o v ea r g u m e n t s .
29Theorem 8 Suppose that Hl (Rl) < 0 and Hk (Rk) < 0. Then the average invest-









l (w − βlπ
∗
k) − 1. (27)
T h et h e o r e ms h o w st h a tt h eﬁrm’s investment is fully determined by the modiﬁed
user cost and modiﬁed wage rate when δl =0 . Recall that these two measures of
average rents, π∗
l and π∗










l} +1 . (28)
Hence, Tobin’s Q is correlated with investment. However, the correlation between
growth rate and Tobin’s Q is indirect. This might explain the weak correlation
between investment and Tobin’s Q found in the literature. This point is examined
quantitatively in the next section.
Similarly to Abel and Eberly (2003), marginal Q is not correlated with investment.
Since the marginal cost of investment is pk in this model, if the solution is interior,
the marginal beneﬁt of investment has to be pk. Hence, the marginal Q does not
have any connection to the investment decision. Although the marginal Q is not
informative, Tobin’s Q is still informative since it contains information about future
rent. This point is emphasized by Abel and Eberly (2003).
Note that investment is periodic. When the ﬁrm makes its employment decision,
there is no investment; when the ﬁrm makes its investment decision, the investment
is lumpy. Lumpy investment is consistent with evidence in Doms and Dunne (1998).
Equation (27) appears when we aggregate them over time.
S i n c eE q u a t i o n( 2 7 )s h o w sg r o s si n v e s t m e n t ,t h en e tg r o w t hr a t em u s tt a k ei n t o













− 1 ≡ gl.
30Hence, the following corollary is immediate.
Corollary 9 Suppose that Hl (Rl) < 0 and Hk (Rk) < 0. The net growth rate of a
ﬁrm is
g ≡ gl = gk =( 1− δk)(1− δl)Π
0




l (w − βlπ
∗
k) − 1.
Corollary 9 shows that the growth rate is independent of ﬁrm size. We would like
t oe x a m i n ew h a ti n ﬂuences the growth rate. Applying the implicit function theorem
to Equations (18), the following propositions are immediate.
Proposition 10 Suppose that Hl (Rl) < 0 and Hk (Rk) < 0. Then there exist






1 (w,u) < 0,π
l






1 (w,u) < 0,π
k
2 (w,u) < 0,
g = g(w,u),g 1 (w,u) ≤ 0,g 2 (w,u) ≤ 0.
Moreover, assume that κ(u − βkπ∗
l) and λ(w − βlπ∗
k) are interior solutions. Then






1 (δl,δk) < 0, π
lδ






1 (δl,δk) < 0, π
kδ




1 (δl,δk) < 0,g
δ
2 (δl,δk) < 0.
The results in the proposition are intuitive. Since an increase in wage rate, user
cost, the depreciation rate of capital stock and labor input all lower the average rents,
they lower the growth rate of the ﬁrm.
6C a l i b r a t i o n
In this section, we specify the production function and calibrate the model. This
exercise is aimed at examining the quantitative relationship between investment, To-
bin’s Q and cash ﬂow. We assume that F (K,L)=z [θKρ +( 1− θ)Lρ]
1
ρ,w h e r e
31ρ < 1. Before showing our calibration results, it may be instructive to look at
analytical solutions given this speciﬁcation. For this purpose, we assume for the
moment that the solutions, κ(u − βkπ∗
l), λ(w − βlπ∗
k), κ(u) and λ(w) are interior.
It is shown from Equations (14) and (15) that
π
∗
























































for any p.T h e v a r i a b l e s
π∗
l and π∗
k are the solutions of these two complex equations. If the conditions for
































Note that after controlling u−βkπl and w−βlπk, z still has a positive impact on the
growth rate. This suggests that cash ﬂow may positively inﬂuence investment after
controlling Q, which is examined quantitatively later.
Calibration: We assume that a ﬁrm makes decisions twice a year. Hence, the
derived investment is considered to be an annual value.
We assume that the price of investment goods, pk,i se q u a lt o1a sab e n c h m a r k ,
the depreciation rate of capital, δk, is 0.05 and the interest rate, i, is 0.08. This
means that user cost, u =0 .13 and β =0 .93. The interest rate, i =0 .08, implies
that the annual interest rate is equal to 0.1664, which is higher than the riskless
rate of return. This number corresponds roughly to an annual interest rate of 0.16,
which was assumed in Abel and Eberly (2002). They argued that the ﬁrm uses
risk-adjusted hurdle rates of return, which correspond to their number. We follow
their argument. Since we deﬁne L as the eﬃciency unit of labor, it is not clear what
32Table 1: Benchmark Parameters
w pk i δk θ δl α
1 1 0.08 0.05 0.3 0.1 1.07
might be a reasonable w. As a benchmark, we assume that w =1 . We also assume
that θ =0 .3, which means the capital share of 0.3 when the production function is
approximated by Cobb—Douglas (ρ =0 ). For the depreciation of human capital, δl,i s
assumed to be 0.1, which corresponds to an annual value of 19 percent9. We assume
that α =1 .07,w h i c hm e a n sα = 1
β − 0.01. Table 1 summarizes our benchmark
parameters.
We have generated the investment—capital ratio, Tobin’s Q and cash ﬂows for
several values of z and ρ,w h i c hl a r g e l yi n ﬂuence investment behavior. For this
purpose, we ﬁrst discuss what is the reasonable range of z and ρ.S i n c e w is assumed












ρ. Hence, we need to
know the reasonable range for ρ to ﬁnd a reasonable range for z.
Berndt (1991, p455) reviews the literature and claims that empirical ﬁndings
from two-digit cross-sectional studies support a Cobb—Douglas production function
(ρ =0 ), though time series estimates of the elasticity show a range of 0.3 to 0.5, which
roughly corresponds to the range of ρ = −1 to ρ = −2.3. However, these estimates
are not based on the eﬃciency unit. Krusell, Ohanian Ríos-Rull and Violante (2000)
estimate the elasticity of substitution between equipment and skilled labor as 0.67,
which corresponds to ρ = −0.5. From this evidence, we expect that a plausible range
of ρ is roughly 0 to −2.5.
9It is not clear what might be a reasonable number. One possible source of information about
the depreciation rate can be found from the separation rate between a ﬁrm and a worker. Yashiv
(2000) assumes that the separation rate is 1.7 percent a month, which corresponds to an annual
value of 19 percent. Christensen, Lentz, Mortensen, Neumann and Werwatz (2005) report that the
separation rate of managers in the largest ﬁrms is 22 percent, where managers are the group who
accumulate the most ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital. These numbers provide a justiﬁcation for our
assumption. In any case, our results do not change much by using other numbers.
33Using data from the National Income and Product Accounts, the capital—output
ratio in the U.S., K/Y , is roughly 2.11 in 2004. Assuming that the labor share,
wL/Y,i s0 . 7 ,t h ee s t i m a t e dv a l u eo fz is 1.03 when ρ =0and 1.25 when ρ = −2.5.
Hence, we consider that a reasonable range of z i sb e t w e e n1a n d1 . 2 5 .
For given ρ, we have generated 100 observations that correspond to diﬀerent z
that increase by 0.0025 starting from 1. Hence, the maximum value of z is 1.2475.
The parameter ρ ranges from −7 to 0 in 0.5 intervals. Hence, we have 15 diﬀerent
values of ρ. We have 1500 observations10. As we have argued, the plausible value
of ρ is expected to be greater than −2.5. However, we ﬁnd that it is instructive to
report the results when ρ is less than −2.5.
Figures 9, 10 and 11 show our calibration results. Figure 9 shows the relationship
between the investment—capital ratio ( I/K ) and the productivity parameter ( z )
for the production functions with diﬀerent elasticity of substitution between capital
and labor, ( 1
1−ρ ). When the production function is Cobb—Douglas ( ρ =0), I/K is
constant at 0 or 0.205. The zero I/K means that the ﬁrm holds to an employment
decision in that range of z, while a positive constant value of I/K implies that the ﬁrm
grows and both investment decisions and employment decisions are constrained by
their upper bounds. In other words, when the production function is Cobb—Douglas
and the ﬁrm grows, there is no interior solution.
When ρ = −2, negative investment appears. The lower bound of I/K is −1,
which means that either the investment or employment decision is constrained by the
lower bound of 011. In this case, the ﬁrm immediately disappears. There is a range
of z that supports interior solutions with negative investment. However, interior
solutions with positive investment still do not appear. When ρ = −4,t h e r ei sa
10Of course, strictly speaking, ρ and z must satisfy a certain relationship. For the purpose of this
exercise, the strict regulation is not particularly important. We allow the variation of ρ and z within
a certain range, which results in the heterogeneity of ﬁrms.
11Technically, we cannot allow 0 inputs. Hence, the lower bound is assumed to be 1 × 10−17,
which is approximately 0.
34Figure 9: The relationship between investment—capital ratio (I/K)a n dp r o -
ductivity (z) for production functions with diﬀerent elasticities of substi-
tutions between capital and labor ( 1
1−ρ).
35Figure 10: The relationship between Tobin’s Q and productivity (z)f o r
production functions with diﬀerent elasticities of substitutions between
capital and labor ( 1




36Figure 11: The relationship between cash ﬂow—capital ratio and productiv-
ity (z) for production functions with diﬀerent elasticities of substitutions
between capital and labor ( 1





K for two consecutive periods.
37range of z that does support interior solutions that bring positive investment. When
ρ = −6, the range of z that supports interior solutions with positive investment
becomes larger. To summarize, we can generate interior solutions with positive
investment, but capital and labor must be more complementary than the estimates
within our plausible range. Possible extensions to mitigate this problem are discussed
in our conclusion.
Figure 10 demonstrates the relationship between Tobin’s Q and z.W e r e p o r t






1+i +1 . For our range of parameters, there is no case for which the
ﬁrm will hold to an investment decision. Hence, every observation generates
Ql(l)
pk .
For all ρ,T o b i n ’ sQ is close to 1 until z reaches a threshold. Above the threshold
level of z,T o b i n ’ sQ expands greatly for a slight increase in z and deviates far from
1. Note that the threshold level of z coincides with that of z above which I/K
hits its upper bound in Figure 9. Once I/K hits its upper bound, an increase in
z cannot increase capital stock further, although it increases market value. That is
why Tobin’s Q becomes sensitive after I/K hits its upper bound.
Figure 11 shows the relationship between the cash ﬂow—capital ratio and z for
the production functions with diﬀerent ρ.T h e c a s h ﬂow—capital ratio is calibrated




K for two consecutive periods. For all ρ,t h e
cash ﬂow—capital ratio increases as z increases except for the region in which either
an employment decision or an investment decision has interior solutions that bring
positive investment. When the ﬁrm expands and has an interior solution, adjustment
cost is generated by static losses as explained before. These static losses make the
cash ﬂow—capital ratio smaller. Once both decisions hit upper bounds, the ﬁrm
cannot increase investment any further. Hence an increase in z simply increases
output and therefore increases the cash ﬂow—capital ratio.
In order to examine the eﬀect of Tobin’s Q and cash ﬂow on investment, we
conduct a simple regression using data generated from our calibration. Table 2
38Table 2: Regression on Investment—Capital Ratio:
ρ ∈ [−7,0] ρ ∈ [−7,0] ρ ∈ [−2.5,0] ρ ∈ [−2.5,0]
Q 0.079 -0.031 0.056 -0.020
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
CASH/K 4.041 3.579
(0.040) (0.088)
Constant -0.429 -1.126 -0.270 -1.059
(0.013) (0.008) (0.017) (0.021)
Adjusted − R2 0.333 0.915 0.316 0.820
# of observation 1500 1500 600 600
Every coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at a 0.5 % level.
reports our results. The ﬁrst column shows that the investment—capital ratio is
positively correlated with Tobin’s Q. However, the coeﬃcient and R2 is small. This
is consistent with evidence [e.g., Chirinko (1993)]. Moreover, once we include cash
ﬂow, the coeﬃcient on Tobin’s Q is negative and cash ﬂow has a strong positive
eﬀect on investment[ the second column]. The robust impacts of cash ﬂow, after
controlling for Tobin’s Q, is found in the investment literature [e.g., Fazzari, Hubbard
and Petersen (1988)]. The results do not change even when we restrict our attention
to the observations with ρ ≥− 2.5. The calibration results show that our model can
generate stylized facts found in the literature.
7 Conclusion and Extensions
This paper applies a simple idea to investment theory: a person cannot make many
decisions at a time, but an organization needs millions of interrelated decisions. The
growth rate of the ﬁrm in our model is derived when the production function displays
constant returns to scale, there is no adjustment cost function and markets are com-
petitive. We show that each investment is lumpy, but adjustment is not immediate.
39Furthermore, the growth rate of a ﬁrm is independent of ﬁrm size and imperfectly
c o r r e l a t e dw i t hT o b i n ’ sQ.
One drawback found in our calibration exercises is that in order to support an
interior solution that has positive investment, the model demands more complemen-
tarity than the estimates, which are expected to be plausible. This indicates that we
need some modiﬁcations for the purpose of empirical research. The current model is
designed to distinguish a novel mechanism for the growth of a ﬁrm from other models
in the literature. For this purpose, we make two extreme assumptions. First, we
completely dismiss any conventional adjustment costs. However, it is natural to think
that not only physical capital accumulation but also human capital accumulation is
likely to involve a certain adjustment cost. Incorporating these additional adjust-
ment costs makes it easier to support interior solutions. Second, we assume that
there is no price adjustment and that the production function has constant returns
to scale. When the production function displays constant returns to scale and there
is no price adjustment, an optimal decision should be on the boundary in a standard
static optimization. Hence, it is understandable to ﬁnd many boundary solutions in
our model. This reasoning suggests that extension to a general equilibrium model
will make the model support interior solutions with more reasonable parameters. Al-
ternatively, the assumption of a decreasing-returns-to-scale production function will
also mitigate problems. These are interesting future extensions.
One may also object to our assumption on routine operation. We assume that
a ﬁrm maintains its previous level of input when it does not give any attention to
optimizing the input. However, it is clear that an alternative decision rule might be
possible. We also assume that a ﬁrm can costlessly change its routine if it wishes to do
so. Common observation tells us that this is not the case. Our assumptions should
be considered as simpliﬁcations to clarify the messages of our paper. However, we
believe that we point out important aspects of a routine: limited attention demands
routine operation, and routine operation causes rent, which can be both the source
40of growth and a barrier to change.
Developing more reasonable models of a routine is beyond the scope of this paper,
but it is also an interesting research agenda. We hope that our model can be extended
t oi n c o r p o r a t em o r er e a l i s t i cf e a t u r e so far o u t i n e .
8 Appendix
The Proof of Proposition 1: We derive only Equation (10). Since the derivation
of Equation (11) is similar, we omit the proof. Substitute D(l)=β max{πkl, πl}
into Equation (8),
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k0∈[0,αk]
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Note that if βlπk ≤ βkπlk, πk = π1
k and if βlπk ≥ βkπlk, πk = π2
k,w h e r ek is a
solution of Equation (29).
Suppose that argmaxk0∈[0,αk] [f (k0) − [u − βkπl]k0 − w]=k∗ and that βlπk ≥




∗) − [u − βkπl]k
∗ − w ≤ f (k
∗) − uk
∗ − w + βlπk ≤ π
2
k.
Similarly, suppose that argmaxk0∈[0,αk] [f (k0) − uk0 − w]+βlπk = k∗ and that βlπk ≤
βkπlk∗.T h e n
π
2
k ≤ f (k
∗) − uk
∗ − w + βlπk ≤ f (k
∗) − [u − βkπl]k














The Proof of Lemma 2: We only prove π∗
l = π
#
l .S i n c e π∗
k = π
#
k can be proved
by the same method, we omit its proof. Deﬁne R∗




Note that πl ≥ R∗





Gl (πk) − (1 − βk)Rl
βk
.
Necessity: Suppose that πl =m a x {Gl (πk),Πl (w)+βkπl}.S u p p o s e t h a t πl ≥
R∗




Rl − Gl (πk)
βk
.
This means that πl ≥ R∗
l (πk) and πl = Rl imply Rl ≥ Gl (πk) and πl = Rl. Similarly,
suppose that πl <R ∗




(1 − βk){Rl − Gl (πk)}
βk
.
This means that πl <R ∗
l (πk) and πl = Gl (πk) imply Rl <G l (πk) and πl = Gl (πk).
Therefore, πl =m a x{Gl (πk),R l}.
Suﬃciency: Suppose that πl =m a x{Gl (πk),R l}.S u p p o s e t h a t Gl (πk) ≤ Rl.T h e n
πl = Rl. Hence, it is shown that
Rl − Gl (πk)=βk [πl − R
∗
l (πk)].
This means that Gl (πk) ≤ Rl and πl = Rl imply πl ≥ R∗
l (πk) and πl = Rl. Similarly,
suppose that Gl (πk) >R l.T h e n πl = Gl (πk). Hence, it is shown that






This means that Gl (πk) >R l and πl = Gl (πk) imply πl ≥ R∗
l (πk) and πl = Gl (πk).
Therefore, πl =m a x{Gl (πk),Πl (w)+βkπl}. Q.E.D.
42The Proof of Lemma 3: We prove H0
l (πl) > 0 and H00
l (πl) ≤ 0.S i n c eH0
k (πk) > 0
and H00
k (πk) ≤ 0 is proved by the same method, we omit it.
H
0
l (πl)=1− βkβlλ[w − βlGk (πl)]κ[r − βkπl] ≥ 1 − β
2α
2 > 0,
where λ[·] is an optimal policy function of Equation (13) and κ[·] is an optimal policy

















The second inequality comes from the fact that Gl (·) and Gk (·) are strictly increasing
and convex functions.
The Proof of Theorem 4: We prove the existence and uniqueness of π∗∗
l .S i n c e
the proof of the existence and uniqueness of π∗∗
k i st h es a m ea st h a to fπ∗∗
l ,w eo m i t
it. Note that Hl (πl) can be written as follows:
Hl (πl)=( 1 − βlβkκ(u − βkπl)λ(w − βlGK (πl)))πl + D(πl)













λ(w − βlGK (πl)).
Note that since λ(w − βlGK (πl)) and κ(u − βkπl) are bounded, D(πl) is also bounded
for any πl.N o t e a l s o t h a t 1 > βlβkκ(u − βkπl)λ(w − βlGK (πl)) for any πl because
of the constraints on choice variables. Hence, there exists large πl ∈ R such that
Hl (πl) > 0, and there also exists small πl ∈ R such that Hl (πl) < 0.S i n c e Hl (πl)
is continuous and strictly increasing in πl, there exists an unique π∗∗
l . Q.E.D.
The Proof of Theorem 5:
Necessity: Suppose that Hl (Rl) < 0 and Hk (Rk) < 0.S u p p o s e t h a t Gl (π∗
k) ≤ Rl.
Then π∗
l = Rl.H e n c e , π∗
k =m a x {Gk (Rl),R k} and Gl (max{Gk (Rl),R k}) ≤ Rl.
0 >R l − Gl (Gk (Rl)) ≥ Gl (max{Gk (Rl),R k}) − Gl (Gk (Rl)). Hence, Gk (Rl) >
43max{Gk (Rl),R k}. Contradiction. Similarly, suppose that Gk (π∗
l) ≤ Rk.T h e n
π∗
k = Rk.H e n c e , π∗
l =m a x {Gl (Rk),R l} and Gk (max{Gl (Rk),R l}) ≤ Rk.
0 >R k − Gk (Gl (Rk)) ≥ Gk (max{Gl (Rk),R l}) − Gk (Gl (Rk)).H e n c e , Gl (Rk) >
max{Gl (Rk),R l}. Contradiction.




k >R k. The result is immediate
from the following lemma.
Lemma 11
Hl (Rl) ≥ 0 iff π
∗∗
l ≤ Rl,
Hk (Rk) ≥ 0 iff π
∗∗
k ≤ Rk.
Proof. Note that since Hl (·) and Hk (·) are strictly increasing functions, the
result is obvious.
Q.E.D.
The Proof of Theorem 7:
Necessity: Note that from theorem 5, either π∗
k = Rk or π∗
l = Rl.
Suppose Gl (Rk) >R l and Gk (Rl) ≤ Rk. Suppose that π∗
k >R k.T h e n π∗
l =
Gl (π∗
k) >G l (Rk) >R l. Contradiction. Hence, π∗
k = Rk.T h e n π∗
l = Gl (Rk) >R l.
Suppose that Gl (Rk) ≤ Rl and Gk (Rl) >R k. Suppose that π∗
l >R l.T h e n
π∗
k = Gk (π∗
l) >G k (Rl) >R k. Contradiction. Hence, π∗
l = Rl.T h e n π∗
k =
Gk (Rl) >R k.
Suppose that Gl (Rk) ≤ Rl and Gk (Rl) ≤ Rk.S u p p o s e t h a t π∗
l = Rl.T h e n
π∗
k =m a x{Gk (Rl),R k} = Rk. Suppose π∗
k = Rk. π∗
l =m a x{Gl (Rk),R l} = Rl.
Suﬃciency:
Suppose π∗
l = Gl (Rk) >R l,π∗








k = Rk. Then the result is obvious. Q.E.D.
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